Utility network interface device configured to detect and report abnormal operating condition

ABSTRACT

A utility network interface device is provided for operation with a utility network. The utility network interface device includes a control unit configured to detect a tampering with a software component of a utility meter with which the utility network interface device is associated. The utility network interface device also includes a notification unit configured to output, external to the utility meter, a visual indication constituting notification of the tampering detected by the control unit. The control unit is configured to automatically control the notification unit to output the external notification of the tampering in response to the detection of the tampering. Also provided are a utility network including the utility network interface device, a method of operating a utility network interface device, and a computer-readable recording medium having a computer program recorded thereon for operating a utility network interface device.

FIELD OF THE DISCLOSURE

The present disclosure relates generally to a utility network interfacedevice operating in connection with a utility meter and configured todetect an abnormal operating condition, such as if the utility networkinterface device has been tampered with, and to report the abnormaloperating condition for appropriate notification thereof.

BACKGROUND

Automated Meter Reading (AMR) systems, including handheld, mobile andnetwork technologies for automatically collecting data from utilitymeters, efficiently and accurately collect metering data, as compared tomanual meter reading. Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) networksemploying AMR technology collect additional types of data, such asinterval data or logging of meter events. The additional data is usedfor a variety of purposes, e.g., usage profiling, time of use billing,demand forecasting, demand response, rate of flow recording, leakdetection, flow monitoring, conservation enforcement, and remoteshutoff.

In an AMR/AMI network, the utility meters are fully electronic with datareading, data storing, and digital packet communications capabilities.The utility meters are all linked together in a wireless LAN (local areanetwork) configuration. In this configuration, each utility meter is anetwork node. Each node can communicate with other nodes directly andwith a communication station of the utility provider via access points.Some nodes may be able to communicate with more than one access point.The access points act as a gateway for the nodes in the wirelessnetwork, and transfer messages between themselves, other nodes and thecommunication station of the utility provider. Similarly, thecommunication station of the utility provider can communicate with thenodes in the wireless LAN via the access points. Access points can bepassive bridges or active data routers/forwarders, depending on the typeof network devices deployed and the applications. An example of anAMR/AMI network and a technique of connecting nodes thereto is found inco-pending U.S. application Ser. No. 11/732,964, which is incorporatedherein by reference in its entirety.

While the introduction of an AMR/AMI network has facilitatedcommunications between utility meters and a communication station of autility provider, tampering with the nodes in the network has become anattendant problem. For example, utility consumers may tamper with theutility meter in an attempt to interfere with the meter's function ofmeasuring usage of a commodity, such as gas, electricity or water. Inaddition, utility consumers may tamper with the utility meter byattempting to interfere with the meter's ability to communicate withother nodes in the network, including a communication station of theutility provider, an access point in the network, a relay station in thenetwork, and/or other meters in the network, and thereby thwart theability of the tampered meter to accurately report usage of thecommodity.

SUMMARY

An exemplary embodiment of the present disclosure provides a utilitynetwork interface device. The exemplary utility network interface devicecomprises a control unit configured to detect a tampering with asoftware component of a utility meter with which the utility networkinterface device is associated. The exemplary utility network interfacedevice also comprises a notification unit configured to output, externalto the utility meter, a visual indication constituting notification ofthe tampering detected by the control unit. The control unit isconfigured to automatically control the notification unit to output theexternal notification of the tampering in response to the detection ofthe tampering.

An exemplary embodiment of the present disclosure provides a utilitynetwork interface device. The exemplary utility network interface devicecomprises a control unit configured to recognize tampering with arespective software component of at least one of a first utility meterwith which the utility network interface device is associated, and asecond utility meter with which the first utility meter is configured tocommunicate over a network. In addition, the exemplary utility networkinterface device comprises a notification unit configured to output,external to the first utility meter, notification of the recognizedtampering of the at least one of the of the first utility meter and thesecond utility meter. The control unit is configured to automaticallycontrol the notification unit to output the external notification of thetampering in response to the recognition of the tampering.

Another exemplary embodiment of the present disclosure provides autility network interface device associated with a first utility meter.The exemplary utility network interface device comprises a communicationunit configured to communicate with at least one second utility meterarranged in a network with the first utility meter, with which theutility network interface device is associated. The exemplary utilitynetwork interface device also comprises a control unit configured todetect a tampering with an operating condition of the second utilitymeter based on a communication transmitted from the second utility meterthat is indicative of a compromised software component of the secondutility meter. In addition, the exemplary utility network interfacedevice comprises a notification unit configured to transmit, external tothe first utility meter, notification of the tampering detected in thesecond utility meter. The control unit is configured to automaticallycontrol the notification unit to transmit the external notification ofthe tampering in response to the detection of the tampering.

In addition, an exemplary embodiment of the present disclosure providesa computer-readable recording medium having a computer program recordedthereon that causes a computer processing unit of a utility networkinterface device to perform operations comprising: detecting a tamperingwith a software component of a utility meter with which the utilitynetwork interface device is associated; and automatically outputting,external to the utility meter, a visual indication constitutingnotification of the detected tampering, in response to the detection ofthe tampering.

Another exemplary embodiment of the present disclosure provides a methodof operating a utility network interface device. The exemplary methodcomprises detecting a tampering with a software component of a utilitymeter with which the utility network interface device is associated. Inaddition, the exemplary method comprises automatically outputting,external to the utility meter, a visual indication constitutingnotification of the detected tampering, in response to the detection ofthe tampering.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

Other objects and advantages of the present disclosure will becomeapparent to those skilled in the art upon reading the following detaileddescription of exemplary embodiments, in conjunction with theaccompanying drawings, in which like reference numerals have been usedto designate like elements, and in which:

FIG. 1 is a block diagram of an exemplary configuration of an AMR/AMInetwork in which features of the present disclosure can be implemented;

FIG. 2 is a block diagram of an exemplary configuration of a utilitynetwork interface device according to at least one embodiment;

FIGS. 3A-3C illustrate perspective views of an exemplary integration ofa network interface card (NIC) with a utility meter;

FIG. 4 illustrates an exemplary configuration of a NIC including adetector configured to detect a prescribed state;

FIG. 5 is an exemplary configuration of a NIC having detectors fordetecting various types of abnormalities and/or tampering;

FIG. 6 is an exemplary configuration of a NIC having an indicator deviceaccording to at least one embodiment; and

FIG. 7 is an exemplary configuration of a NIC having an indicator deviceaccording to at least one embodiment.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF EXEMPLARY EMBODIMENTS

FIG. 1 is a network diagram illustrating an exemplary configuration ofan AMR/AMI network 100 in which features of the present disclosure canbe implemented. FIG. 1 illustrates the AMR/AMI network 100 in the formof a mesh network, as an example of the type of network in which thepresent disclosure can be implemented. The present disclosure can beimplemented in other types of networks. For example, the AMR/AMI network100 can be a star network in which a plurality of nodes communicateaccording to predetermined communication paths with a central node, suchas a communication station of a utility provider.

In the exemplary network configuration illustrated in FIG. 1, thenetwork 100 employs one or more access points 110, e.g., gateways, thatare connected to a communication station 120 of a utility provider. Theconnections between the access point(s) 110 and the communicationstation 120 may be provided by a wide area network (WAN), a virtualprivate network (VPN), or other suitable configuration, through wiredand/or wireless communication mediums. Each access point 110 can alsoconnect directly or indirectly with one or more utility meters 130 via awireless local area network (LAN), for example. The utility meters 130can communicate with each other and with the access points via thewireless LAN, to continuously keep track of preferred pathways forconnection to the access points. According to an exemplary embodiment,the access points 110 can serve as an interface between thecommunication station 120 of the utility provider and one or moreutility meters 130.

It is also conceived that a meter may communicate directly with thecommunication station 120 of the utility provider if an access point 110is not within a predetermined proximity of the meter 130. Alternatively,the meter 130 may communicate directly with the communication station120 if the quality of communication between the meter 130 and thecommunication station 120 exceeds the quality of communication betweenthe meter 130 and an access point 110 or exceeds the quality ofcommunication between the access point 110 and the communication station120. According to an exemplary embodiment, relay stations 140 may alsobe provided in the network 100 as repeater stations between meters 130and one or more of the access points 110 or communication station 120.

According to exemplary embodiments as provided herein, the utilitymeters 130 are enabled to communicate with each other and other nodes ofthe network 100 by being equipped with a utility network interfacedevice. An example of a utility network interface device is a networkinterface card (NIC), which will be described in further detail herein.It will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that the operativefunctions performed by the utility meter 130, as described herein, canbe performed by the utility network interface device (e.g., NIC)associated with the utility meter 130. The NIC can be associated withthe meter 130 by being integrated in, physically attached to, and/orelectrically connected to the utility meter 130. Accordingly, as usedherein, any reference to a utility meter 130 is intended to encompass autility meter 130 having a utility network interface device associatedwith the utility meter 130.

The addition or subtraction of utility meters 130, as nodes in thenetwork 100, is dynamically accommodated in the network 100. Examples oftechniques for connecting and/or disconnecting meters to/from an AMR/AMInetwork of a utility provider and establishing communication protocolsbetween the nodes in the network are disclosed in co-pending U.S.application Ser. Nos. 11/732,964 and 12/139,413, the entire contents ofwhich are hereby incorporated by reference. An example of a techniquefor establishing security protocols for added and/or disconnected nodesin a AMR/AMI network such as the network 100 illustrated in FIG. 1 isdisclosed in co-pending U.S. application Ser. No. 12/187,354, the entirecontents of which are hereby incorporated by reference.

FIG. 2 is a block diagram illustrating an exemplary configuration of autility network interface device configured to operate in conjunctionwith a utility meter 130, such as gas, electric and water meters, forexample. To enable the utility meters 130 to communicate with thevarious nodes (e.g., access points 110, communication station 120, otherutility meters 130, relays 140, etc.) in the network 100, each utilitymeter 130 of the AMR/AMI network 100 is provided with a utility networkinterface device. As discussed above, a NIC is an example of a utilitynetwork interface device. A NIC 2 is a module that can be attached to orincorporated within a utility meter 130 to constitute the utilitynetwork interface device of the utility meter 130. According to anexemplary embodiment, the NIC 2 may be constituted by a single printedcircuit board. FIG. 2 illustrates an exemplary configuration of a NIC 2in which the structural components of the NIC 2 are mounted on a singleprinted circuit board.

As illustrated in FIG. 2, the NIC 2 may include an AC power adapter 3and a power supply 4. The AC power adapter 3 connects an external powersource to the power supply 4 to provide an input voltage to the powersupply 4. The external power source may constitute a power source in theutility meter 130 to which the NIC 2 is attached, and/or a power sourceexternal to the utility meter 130. The power supply 4 converts the inputvoltage to various output voltages for the various powered components ofthe NIC 2. Alternatively or as a backup, the input voltage for the powersupply 4 can be provided by a battery provided on the NIC 2.

An Application-Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) 5 of the NIC 2 isencoded to control the components of the NIC 2 via a Central ProcessingUnit (CPU) 6 and a memory 7. The CPU 6 can be an ARM7 processor, forexample. The CPU 6 is configured to control the operations of the NIC 2.The CPU 6 can include, for example, a processor for controlling theaggregate operations of the NIC 2, a non-volatile memory, such as aread-only memory (ROM) and/or flash memory, for example, that storesprograms, such as firmware, application programs, and logic instructionswhich are implemented by the processor, and a volatile memory, such as arandom-access memory (RAM), for example, that is used as a workingmemory by the processor when executing the firmware, programs and/orlogic instructions stored in the non-volatile memory. The firmwarestored in the non-volatile memory includes programmed instructions forcarrying out basic (i.e., fundamental) operations of the NIC 2, and mayalso include an operating system (OS) of the NIC 2. The feature of a“control unit” as described herein can be encompassed by the CPU 6individually or in combination with the ASIC 5.

A meter interface 8 of the NIC 2 is operatively connected to the CPU 6and receives measured usage data and other data from the utility meter130. According to an exemplary embodiment, the meter interface 8 canalso send information to the utility meter 130 as needed, such as acommand to shut off power to the building or premises associated withthe meter, for example.

A transceiver 9 is provided on the NIC 2 for communicating wirelesslywith the AMR/AMI network 100. The transceiver 9 includes a data port 10for providing a two-way data connection between the transceiver 9 andthe CPU 6. Similarly, an antenna 11 provides a two-way data connectionbetween the transceiver 9 and the AMR/AMI network 100. A power amplifier12 drives the antenna 11 and is surge protected by a voltage protectiondevice 13. An oscillator 14 generates a suitable carrier frequency forthe power amplifier 12, e.g., 1.8 GHz. A crystal oscillator 15 generatesan appropriate frequency, e.g., 9.2 MHz, which provides a stable clocksignal to the CPU 6 and the ASIC 5, and also stabilizes the carrierfrequency of the oscillator 14. When the meter and NIC 2 are powered up,the CPU 6 controls the transceiver 9, by way of commands received fromthe ASIC 5, to progress through various stages of network connection, tothereby establish the meter as a functioning node in the network 100.

In the illustrated embodiment, an LED 16 is provided on the NIC 2 andoperatively connected to the CPU 6, to indicate the status of theutility meter 130 and the NIC 2 during an attempted connection of theutility meter 130 with the AMR/AMI network 100. In one embodiment, asingle color LED can be used. In this case, the CPU 6 can communicatethe various states of connectivity by controlling the LED 16 to vary itsflash pattern. Alternatively, a multi-color LED, such as a tri-colorLED, can be used, and selectively controlled by the CPU 6 to illustratevarious states respectively associated with predefined color and/orflashing patterns. A more detailed discussion of these operations can befound in previously identified application Ser. No. 12/139,413.

FIGS. 3A-3C illustrate perspective views of an exemplary integration ofa NIC 2 with a utility meter 130. In the example of FIGS. 3A-3C, theexisting meter is an electromechanical gas meter. It is to be understoodthat the present disclosure is not limited to the illustrative exampleof FIGS. 3A-3C.

FIG. 3A illustrates an exploded perspective view of an exemplaryintegration of a NIC 2 with a utility meter 130. The utility meter 130includes a first segment 302 that includes a rotating member 304, whichrotates in proportion to the amount of commodity consumed. For example,the rotating member 304 can be configured to rotate around an axis(e.g., a central axis substantially perpendicular to a longitudinal axisof the rotating member 304), in an amount proportional to a unit ofconsumption of a commodity. Reference numeral 306 denotes securing holesfor receiving a fastening element, such as a screw or bolt, for example.The utility meter 130 also includes a second segment 314 that includesdials 316, which can illustrate a numerical amount of the commodityconsumed in accordance with a number of rotations of the rotating member304.

Reference numeral 310 denotes an integrating member which is integratedbetween the first and second segments 302, 314 of the utility meter 130.The printed circuit board on which the constituent elements of the NIC 2are arranged is provided on the rear side of the integrating member 310facing toward the first segment 302 of the utility meter 130. Referencenumber 312 denotes a power source housing section in which a batteryand/or circuitry for connecting to an external power source can behoused. Reference numeral 324 denotes a measurement counter which can beconnected to the rotating member 304 and rotate in correspondence withthe number of revolutions of the rotating member 304. For example, themeasurement counter 324 can be configured to count each unit ofconsumption of the commodity based on each unit of consumption of thecommodity represented by a predetermined number of rotations by therotating member 304. The number of rotations of the measurement counter324 can, in turn, control the indicated measurement of the consumedcommodity by the dials 316. It is to be understood that the measurementcounter 324 is not limited to the example illustrated in FIG. 3A inwhich the measurement counter 324 operates in connection with therotating member 304 of a gas meter. The measurement counter 324 canconstitute any component of the NIC 2 that is connected to a componentof the utility meter 130 configured to measure a unit of consumption ofa particular commodity. For example, the measurement counter 324 of theNIC 2 can be any mechanical or electromechanical component which isphysically in contact with and/or configured to electronicallycommunicate with a corresponding counter in the utility meter 130.

As illustrated in the example of FIG. 3A, the second segment 314 can besecured to the integrating member 310 and the first segment 302 viafasteners 318 that can be inserted through securing holes 308 incorrespondence with securing holes 306. Reference numeral 320 denotes acover piece that provides environmental and physical security for thedials 316 of the second segment 314, the measurement counter 324, theNIC 2 and the rotating member 304 of the first segment 302. The coverpiece 320 can be made of a transparent material to permit externalviewing of the dials 316. The cover piece 320 can be secured to theintegrating member 310 and the first segment via fasteners 326. Coverplugs 322 can be provided to prevent access to one or more of thefasteners 326, and thereby protect the integrity of the integrated NIC 2and utility meter.

FIG. 3B illustrates a front perspective view of the NIC 2 integratedwith the utility meter 130 in accordance with the assembly integrationillustrated in the example of FIG. 3A. FIG. 3C illustrates a perspectivetop view of the integrating member 310, relative to the frontperspective view illustrated in FIG. 3B. FIG. 3C illustrates an exampleof a connection between the measurement counter 324 and the rotatingmember 304, and the placement of the NIC 2 on the rear side of theintegrating member 310 facing the first segment 302 of the utility meter130, opposite to the cover piece 320 provided on the front end of theintegrating member 310. The measurement counter 324 can, for example,constitute part of the meter interface 8 illustrated in FIG. 2.

According to an exemplary embodiment, as illustrated in FIG. 2, the NIC2 can include a detector 20. The detector 20 facilitates detection of atampering with the utility meter 130 and/or its associated NIC 2. Forexample, the detector 20 can facilitate detection of the occurrence of aprescribed state that interferes with the ability of the utility meter130 with which the NIC 2 is associated to measure consumption of acommodity and/or report consumption of the commodity.

Conceptually, there are several types of physical tampering that can bedetected by the CPU 6 based on an output from the detector 20. Forexample, an individual may attempt to interfere with the functions ofthe utility meter 130 in measuring usage of a commodity for which theutility meter 130 is designed. Alternatively, an individual may attemptto disconnect the NIC 2 entirely from the utility meter 130, tointerrupt or cease transmission of measured consumption amounts to thecommunication station 120 of the utility provider.

According to an exemplary embodiment, the detector 20 may be embodied bya reed switch, which is able to detect the intensity of a magnetic fieldand respond when the intensity of the magnetic field crosses a thresholdvalue. A reed switch can therefore be considered to be a state switch inthat its response or lack of a response represents one of two states,where one state is represented by the reed switch detecting theintensity of a magnetic field to be greater than or equal to a thresholdvalue, and the opposite state is represented by the reed switchdetecting that the intensity of the magnetic field is below thethreshold value.

As one example of tamper detection, a reed switch embodying the detector20 can have contacts that are open in an activated state in which theNIC 2 is attached to the utility meter 130. In this case, if the NIC 2is detached from the utility meter 130, the contacts will switch totheir normally closed state when the NIC 2 is no longer within apredetermined proximity of the magnetic field of a magnet included inthe utility meter 130 for such detection purposes. Alternatively, thecontacts of the reed switch can be closed by the magnetic field andswitch to a normally open state when separated by a sufficient distancefrom the magnetic field of the magnet.

In several exemplary embodiments described hereinafter, a reed switch isdescribed as an example of one type of detection component that can beembodied in the detector 20. However, it is to be understood that otherstate switches can be utilized instead of, or in conjunction with, areed switch. For example, a contact switch can be employed to detectwhether the NIC 2 has been physically separated from the utility meter130. The detector 20 can also be embodied by MEMS(Microelectromechanical systems) sensors configured to detect movement,such as the movement of an outer casing of the NIC 2 away from theelectrical components of the NIC 2, for example. In addition, thedetector 20 can also be embodied by a current/power monitor circuitconfigured to transmit a notification signal to the CPU 6 ifcurrent/power to the NIC 2 has been terminated or reduced below anacceptable operating level. Moreover, the detector 20 can be embodied bya seal or tag that can communicate via RFID (radio frequencyidentification), for example, to indicate to an RFID reading device thatthe tag or seal has been tampered with or moved without authorization.

The detector 20 can be configured to automatically produce a statesignal when a prescribed state is detected in connection with the NIC 2and/or the utility meter 130 with which the NIC 2 is associated. Forexample, the detector 20 can produce a stage signal upon the occurrenceof a prescribed state that interferes with the ability of the utilitymeter 130 and/or NIC 2 to measure consumption of a commodity and/orreport consumption of the commodity. In the exemplary embodimentillustrated in FIG. 2, the detector 20 is a distinct component from theCPU 6 in the NIC 2, and may provide the CPU 6 with a produced statesignal. However, it is to be understood that the detector 20 mayalternatively be configured to operate, for example, as a switch, andsupply (or cease to supply depending on the configuration of the switch)one or more components of the NIC 2 (e.g., CPU 6) with an appliedvoltage upon the occurrence of a prescribed state that interferes withthe ability of the utility meter 130 and/or associated NIC 2 to measureconsumption of a commodity and/or report consumption of the commodity.

According to an exemplary embodiment as illustrated in FIG. 4, thedetector 20 can be provided on any portion of the NIC 2, and a magnetcan be attached on a portion of the utility meter 130 proximate to theportion of the NIC 2 on which the detector 20 is provided. During anon-tampered state, in which the detector 20 is within the designatedproximity to the magnet attached to the utility meter 130, the strengthof the magnetic field will be sufficient to hold the detector 20 in itsactivated (non-default) state.

On the other hand, if the NIC 2 is physically separated from the utilitymeter 130 with which the NIC 2 is associated, the NIC 2 would not beable to collect data corresponding to the amount of commodity consumedvia the meter interface 8 and/or communicate the amount of measuredcommodity via the transceiver 9. In the example whether the NIC 2 isphysically separated from the associated utility meter 130, the reedswitch in the detector 20 will switch to a different state when theseparation distance is such that the magnetic field of the magnetattached to the meter is no longer sufficient to maintain the switch inits activated state. For example, upon detecting that the magnetic fieldis below the threshold value, the detector 20 provides a state signal(e.g., an interrupt signal) to the CPU 6.

According to an exemplary embodiment, the CPU 6 can be configured toautomatically determine that the NIC 2 has been tampered with upon theproduction of a state signal by the detector 20, and execute anappropriate procedure, as described hereinafter. For instance, the CPU 6can be configured to detect a tampering with the utility meter 130and/or its associated NIC 2 in accordance with the state signal producedby the detector 20. The state signal can represent there is aninterference with the ability of the utility meter 130 (including theNIC 2 associated therewith) to measure consumption of a commodity and/orreport consumption of a measured commodity.

FIG. 5 illustrates an example of the printed circuit board of a NIC 2 inaccordance with the examples of FIGS. 3A-3C in which the NIC 2 isattached to a gas meter. Reference numerals 530 denote pads on whichfirst and second terminals of a reed switch can be arranged. Theplacement of the pads 530 is illustrative and the present disclosure isnot limited thereto.

Assume, for example, that a magnet is positioned on the utility meter130 with which the NIC 2 is associated, in proximity to the placement ofthe reed switch provided on pads 530. If the NIC 2 is removed from theutility meter 130, the reed switch on pads 530 can be configured todetect that the intensity of the magnetic field of the magnet inproximity to the associated utility meter 130 is below a thresholdvalue. The reed switch can be configured to produce and provide a statesignal to the CPU 6 when detecting that the intensity of the magneticfield falls below a prescribed threshold value, i.e., such that themagnetic field of the magnet attached to the utility meter is no longersufficient to maintain the reed switch in its activated state.

In another form of tampering, a utility meter 130 may have a rotatingdisk that can be representative of the amount of the commodity consumed.For example, a utility meter 130 may have a rotating disk similar to therotating member 304 illustrated in the examples of FIGS. 3A and 3C. Insuch a situation, there is a possibility that an individual could placea strong magnet on the utility meter 130 in an attempt to create acounterforce that slows down the rotation of the disk and/or themeasurement counter 324 of the NIC 2 integrated with the rotating disk.To detect such an occurrence, a normally open reed switch can beincluded in the detector 20 at a location that may be influenced by thepresence of the strong field of the tampering magnet, causing the reedswitch of the detector 20 to close and produce a state signal fordetection by the CPU 6.

For example, the detector 20 can include a reed switch in which itsfirst and second terminals are provided on pads 540 in FIG. 5. The reedswitch on pads 540 could detect the presence of a magnetic field havingan intensity sufficient to interfere with an operation of the utilitymeter 130 and/or associated NIC 2, such as the rotating member 304and/or measurement counter 324, for example. The detector 20 can detectthe presence of the magnet when detecting that the intensity of itsmagnetic field exceeds a predetermined threshold value, and produce astate signal for detection by the CPU 6.

According to an exemplary embodiment, the NIC 2 can include one or moremeasurement counters to measure consumption of a utility, such as themeasurement counter 324 illustrated in FIGS. 3A and 3C, for example.According to the exemplary embodiment of FIG. 5, the detector 20 caninclude a reed switch (e.g., the reed switch on pads 540) configured todetect a presence of a magnetic field having an intensity sufficient tointerfere with the measurement counter(s) 324, by detecting whether theintensity of the magnetic field exceeds a predetermined threshold value.The detector 20 can be configured to produce and provide a state signalto the CPU 6 in response to detecting that the intensity of the magneticfield is above the threshold value. Accordingly, the detector 20 canadvantageously detect when an individual is attempting to alter accuratereadings of consumption of a utility commodity by the placement of oneor more magnets intended to interfere with the operation of the utilitymeter 130 or with its associated NIC 2.

According to exemplary embodiments described above, contacts and/orsensors of the state switch (e.g., reed switch) embodied in the detector20 are configured to switch to an opposite state when the presence of aprescribed state is detected. For example, as described above, theabnormality may be the detection that a magnetic field of a magnetattached to the utility meter opposite to the detector 20 has decreasedto below a threshold value. Conversely, the abnormality may be thedetection that a magnetic field created by the introduction of a foreignmagnet exceeds a threshold value. Accordingly, the detector 20 isconfigured to produce a state signal upon the occurrence of a prescribedstate that interferes with the ability of the utility meter 130 and/orits associated NIC 2 to measure consumption of a commodity and/or reportconsumption of the commodity.

Exemplary embodiments of the present disclosure also provide a techniqueof detecting an abnormal operating condition, such as a tampering, bydetecting whether the operation of the utility meter 130 and/or itsassociated NIC 2 deviate from expected operations over a predeterminedperiod of time. Exemplary embodiments described below are configured todetect the occurrence of tampering based on whether detected operatingconditions of the utility meter 130 and/or its associated NIC 2 comportwith expected operating conditions during a predetermined period oftime.

For instance, in the example of the utility meter 130 having therotating disk, the rotating disk may have a small magnet on it, and areed switch can be located adjacent to the disk to detect the magnet asit passes by the reed switch during each rotation. In theabove-described exemplary embodiment, the utility meter 130 may have adisk (e.g., rotating member 304) configured to rotate around an axis ofthe disk, in an amount proportional to a unit of consumption of acommodity, and a magnet can be attached to a peripheral portion of thedisk. The detector 20 can include one or more reed switches to detectthe presence of the magnet attached to the disk when an intensity of amagnetic field of the magnet exceeds a threshold value. The detector 20can, in turn, produce a detection signal which represents detection ofconsumption of the unit of the commodity, each time the detector 20detects the presence of the magnet.

For example, the first and second terminals of a reed switch can beplaced on pads 510 or pads 520, respectively, to detect a completerevolution of the measurement counter 324 integrated with the rotatingmember 304. This configuration is advantageous when one completerevolution of the magnet of the rotating disk represents a unitmeasurement of consumption. Every closure and/or opening of the reedswitch (depending on the manner in which the reed switch is configuredto operate) sends a pulse to a counter (e.g., measurement counter 324),to indicate a prescribed amount of consumption of the commodity beingmeasured. In an attempt to thwart the measurement of the commodity, anindividual may place a stronger magnet on the outside of the magnet ofthe rotating disk to hold the switch in one state or another, andthereby prevent the pulses from being generated.

In an alternative configuration, two reed switches can be provided onopposite diametric sides of the rotating disk. For example, withreference to FIG. 5, the first and second terminals of a first reedswitch can be placed on pads 510, respectively, and the first and secondterminals of a second reed switch can be placed on pads 520,respectively. The two reed switches send alternating pulses when theyrespectively detect the passing of the magnet as the rotating diskrotates. If the tampering magnet is only strong enough to hold one ofthe two reed switches in a given state, such as the reed switch closerto the outer wall of the NIC 2, for example, the other reed switch willcontinue to generate pulses. The CPU 6 can detect that only one reedswitch is sending pulses, in which case the CPU 6 can automaticallydetect an abnormal operating condition, such as a tampering with theutility meter 130 and/or its associated NIC 2.

Alternatively, if the tampering magnet is strong enough to hold bothswitches in a steady state, the CPU 6 can detect the absence of anyactivity from the two switches over some defined period of time. Forexample, the memory 7 can have pre-stored therein an expected level ofpulses to be detected for a given period of time. Alternatively, thetransceiver 9 can receive updated data concerning expected pulsedetection values, and the CPU 6 can store such updated data in thememory 7. Upon detecting the absence of any pulses or a number of pulsesbelow a threshold value during a particular period of time, the CPU 6can determine that there is a malfunction which could be the result oftampering.

In the above-described examples in which the rotating disk has a magnetand the reed switch(es) transmit a pulse each time the magnet of therotating disk passes thereby, the transmitted pulses each represent adetected amount of commodity measurement. For example, one completerevolution of the magnet on the rotating disk may represent theconsumption of a specified unit of the commodity. The CPU 6, based onpre-stored or acquired expected pulse detection values, can detect anabnormal operating condition, such as tampering with the utility meter130 and/or the NIC 2, if the number of detection signals received fromthe detector 20 is below the expected pulse detection values for aparticular period of time. For example, the CPU 6 can access datarecorded in the memory 7 that represents a threshold value for a numberof expected pulse detections over a particular period of time. The CPU 6can then detect whether there is a tampering with the utility meter 130when the number of detection signals (e.g., pulses) produced by thedetector 20 is below the threshold value recorded in the memory 7. TheNIC 2 can also receive updated threshold data via the transceiver 9, forexample, from a node in the network. The update threshold datarepresents an update to the threshold value data recorded in the memory7. Upon receiving the updated threshold data, the CPU 6 can control thememory 7 to record the updated threshold data. For example, the CPU 6can cause the memory 7 to overwrite the prior threshold value data withthe updated threshold data. Alternatively, the CPU 6 can control thememory 7 to store varied threshold data for different time periods. Forexample, the CPU 6 can control the memory 7 to store threshold data formonths in the summer and different threshold data for months in thewinter.

In accordance with exemplary embodiments described above, the CPU 6 isable to autonomously detect that the NIC 2 has been tampered with basedon a state signal(s) produced by the detector 20 to the CPU 6. Inaddition or alternatively, when the detector 20 transmits a detectionsignal upon occurrence of each detected unit measurement of a commodityin the utility meter 130, the CPU 6 is configured to detect a tamperingwith the utility meter 130 and/or the associated NIC 2 when a number ofdetection signals received from the detector 20 over a predeterminedperiod of time is below a threshold value. Accordingly, the CPU 6 isconfigured to detect an abnormal operating condition, such as atampering, using either or both of these techniques.

The above-described embodiments are directed to the detection of anexample of an abnormal operating condition, namely the detection of aphysical tampering with the NIC 2. In addition, the CPU 6 of a NIC 2 canalso be configured to detect tampering and/or an abnormality with thesoftware and security protocols of the NIC 2.

As illustrated in FIG. 2, each NIC 2 includes a memory 7. According toan exemplary embodiment, the memory 7 is a non-volatile memory, as oneexample of a computer-readable recording medium. As discussed above, theCPU 6 can include a non-volatile memory such as a ROM, and a volatilememory such as a RAM, for example. One or more of such non-volatilerecording mediums of the NIC 2 may have recorded thereon an imagecorresponding to the set of software executable in the NIC 2 by the CPU6. According to an exemplary embodiment, the software image maycorrespond to the firmware of the NIC 2. The software image may bepre-stored when the NIC 2 is installed at the site of the utility meter130, or the software image may be acquired and/or updated upon obtainingsecurity keys that enable the NIC 2 to communicate with neighboringnodes and the communication station 120 of the utility provider. Anexample of a technique for authenticating a node added to an ARM/AMInetwork 100 and establishing security keys that enable the node tocommunicate, as a full-fledged network node, with neighboring nodes,access points, relay stations and a communication station of a utilityprovider is disclosed in the above-described U.S. application Ser. No.12/187,354, whose entire contents have been incorporated by referenceherein.

While physical tampering can be more apparent to the human eye,tampering with a software component of a utility meter 130 is generallyless apparent. The CPU 6 of a NIC 2 executes a software-based operatingsystem, and can execute one or more application software programs viathe operating system. In addition, each NIC 2 has been assigned and canacquire security-based information that include, for example, securitykeys and/or security certificates which are used to authenticate theassociated meter 130 during communication with another node in thenetwork. As used herein, the term “software component” is intended toencompass one or more of the operating system of the NIC 2, applicationprograms executable by the CPU 6 of the NIC 2, and the security-basedinformation of the NIC 2. Accordingly, as used herein, the discussion ofa tampering with a software component of the meter 130 is intended toencompass one or more of a tampering with the operating system of theNIC 2, an application program executed by the CPU 6 of the NIC 2, and/orthe security-based information of the NIC 2.

The present disclosure provides several techniques of detectingtampering with the software components of a utility meter 130. A firsttechnique is that the CPU 6 of the NIC 2 autonomously detects that oneor more software components of the NIC 2 have been tampered with orcorrupted for some reason. A second technique is that a neighboringnode, through its communication with a NIC 2, detects that one or moreof the software components of the NIC 2 have been tampered with orcorrupted. A third technique is that the communication station 120 ofthe utility provider, upon receiving one or more communications from anode, whether directly or indirectly, can determine that one or more ofthe software components of the NIC 2 have been tampered with orcorrupted. These exemplary techniques will be further discussed belowindividually. It is to be understood, however, that these techniques canbe implemented and utilized in combination.

Each NIC 2 has a secure bootloader. The security keys stored in thememory of the NIC 2 may correspond to the image recorded in the memoryof the NIC 2 and may be utilized to verify a signature of the recordedimage. Therefore, as one type of tamper detection provided herein, whenthe CPU 6 boots to a software image that is not secure, the CPU 6 candetermine that the signature of the software does not match a signatureobtainable by the security key(s) stored in the NIC 2, and therebydetect an abnormal operating condition. Accordingly, the CPU 6 candetect corruption and/or tampering of an executable image based onmismatched security keys. For example, if a hacker surreptitiously loadsan altered image or virus to corrupt the image already stored in thenon-volatile memory of the NIC 2, the CPU 6 can be configured toautonomously detect the existence of such tampering.

Another example of an abnormal operating condition is where the securitykeys of the NIC 2 have become corrupted for some reason, e.g.,tampering. In this case, the NIC 2 will not be able to successfullycommunicate with the communication station 120 because the securitycredentials of the NIC 2 have been corrupted. According to an exemplaryembodiment, the CPU 6 of the NIC 2 having the corrupted key(s) canself-detect that its key(s) have been corrupted. For example, if, byconvention, the NIC 2 receives a confirmation message from a neighboringnode and/or the communication station 120 when transmitting a message tothe neighboring node and/or communication station 120, and the NIC 2having the corrupted key(s) does not receive such a confirmationmessage, the CPU 6 can be configured to detect that the security key(s)of the NIC 2 have been corrupted. Alternatively, if the CPU 6 receives,via the transceiver 9, a message from a neighboring node or thecommunication station 120 indicating that its communication transmittedthereto is not being accepted, the CPU 6 can detect that the securitykey(s) have been corrupted. Similarly, if the CPU 6 receives, via thetransceiver 9, a message from the communication station 120 that itssecurity key(s) have been corrupted, the CPU 6 can process the messageand determine that an abnormal operating condition exists.

According to the second technique described above for detectingtampering with a software component of a utility meter 130, a NIC 2 canautonomously detect an abnormal operating condition in connection with aneighboring node, based on its communication with the neighboring node.For example, if the NIC 2 detects a number of requests from aneighboring node to relay messages to other nodes or the communicationstation 120 that exceed a threshold for a given period of time, the CPU6 determines that the authentication credentials of the neighboring nodemay be corrupted and/or invalid. In this case, the CPU 6 can instructthe transceiver 9 to transmit a notification of an abnormal operatingcondition associated with the neighboring node. The CPU 6 canspecifically identify the neighboring node in the notificationtransmitted to the central station. In addition, the CPU 6 may beconfigured to detect abnormal operating conditions in terms of theamount of traffic seen in the network 100, the authenticationcredentials it receives from direct neighbors or any abnormalfluctuation in power state that the CPU detects. If any of thesedetected values exceeds a threshold value stored in a memory of the NIC2, the CPU 6 can then determine that an abnormal operating condition mayexist, and transmit a notification signal to the communication station120.

According to the third technique described above, the communicationstation 120 can be configured to detect a tampering or other abnormaloperating condition with a NIC 2 in the network based on a communicationreceived, directly or indirectly, from that NIC 2. For example, if thecommunication station 120 receives a message from a NIC 2, but themessage does not possess the requisite security credentials, thecommunication station 120 can be configured to notify the NIC 2 of apossible tampering, and notify the other nodes in the network that theNIC 2 is not to be trusted until otherwise informed, because of thesuspected tampering with the NIC 2.

In accordance with the above-described embodiments, the CPU 6 can thenautomatically control a notification unit (e.g., the transceiver 9,LED(s) 16, display 19, etc.) of the utility meter 130 to output,external to the utility meter 130, notification of the tamperingdetected by the CPU 6.

The type of notification can depend on the type of tampering detected bythe CPU 6. For example, in the case of a physical tampering, the CPU 6can automatically generate a tampering notification signal and controlthe transceiver 9 to transmit the tampering notification signal to aneighboring node in the network 100 with which the NIC 2 is able tocommunicate. According to an exemplary embodiment, the CPU 6 can beconfigured to automatically control the transceiver 9 to output theexternal notification of the abnormal event and/or tampering, inresponse to the detection of the abnormal event and/or tampering, sothat another node in the network 100 (e.g., the communication station120) is informed of the detected abnormality at the time the abnormalityis detected. For example, the CPU 6 can be configured to generate anabnormality notification signal and control the transceiver 9 totransmit the abnormality notification signal to a node within thenetwork 100, in response to the detection of the tamper or abnormaloperating condition, so that the tamper or abnormal operation conditioncan be notified to the communication station 120 of the utility providerin real-time, i.e., at the time that the tamper or abnormal operatingcondition was detected by the CPU 6 to have occurred. According to anexemplary embodiment, the CPU 6 can control the transceiver 9 totransmit the notification signal wirelessly to another node and/or thecommunication station 120 of the utility provider. Alternatively or inaddition, the CPU 6 can control the transceiver 9 to transmit thenotification signal through wired transmission mediums.

For example, upon determining that there has been a tamper with the NIC2, the CPU 6 can be configured to control the transceiver 9 to transmitan abnormality notification signal destined for a neighboring node withwhich the NIC 2 previously communicated and/or is authorized tocommunicate. Alternatively, the node that detected an abnormality cantransmit the abnormality notification signal to the communicationstation 120 as its destination, either directly or via another node,access point 110, relay station 140, etc. An example of a techniqueutilized by a node in an AMR/AMI network such as the network 100 foridentifying neighboring nodes and determining which of the neighboringnodes to use for reliable transmission and reception of communicationsto/from the communication station 120 of the utility provider isdisclosed in U.S. application Ser. No. 11/560,938, the entire contentsof which are hereby incorporated by reference.

In addition to or as an alternative to the transceiver 9 transmitting atamper notification signal to another node in the network 100, the CPU 6can control the notification unit to output a visual indication of thetampering, in response to the detection of the tampering. For example,in the case of detecting tampering with a software component of autility meter 130, the CPU 6 of the NIC 2 associated with that meter maycontrol the notification unit to visually display a tamperingnotification, to assist utility personnel with diagnosing the detectedabnormality, for example, when dispatched to the location of the utilitymeter 130. In the examples described above with reference to the firstthrough third techniques of detecting tampering with a softwarecomponent of a utility meter 130, which techniques can be combined asappropriate, the CPU 6 of the NIC 2 detecting the tampering or otherabnormal operating condition can be configured to output, external tothe NIC 2, notification of the detected abnormal operating condition tothe communication station 120, so that personnel of the utility providercan take appropriate action in resolving the abnormal operatingcondition. The CPU 6 of the NIC 2 in which the abnormal operatingcondition was detected can cause its transceiver 9 to transmit anotification signal wirelessly to another node in the network 100.Alternatively or in addition, the CPU 6 of the NIC 2 in which theabnormal operating condition was detected can activate an indicatordevice within the NIC 2 or external thereto to visually display thenotification. For example, the CPU 6 of the NIC 2 can cause the LED 16to display a representation of the notification according to apredetermined pattern of illuminating the LED 16. In FIG. 2, one LED 16is illustrated. However, additional LEDs may be provided, and the LEDsmay be single or multi-color.

According to an exemplary embodiment, the CPU 6 can be configured toilluminate the LED(s) 16 according to a pattern associated with a typeof tampering detected by the CPU 6. For example, the CPU 6 can cause theLED(s) 16 to display a first pattern associated with the NIC 2 havinginvalid security keys, a second pattern associated with the NIC 2 beingunable to find a secure image to which to boot, and a third patternassociated with the CPU 6 detecting that the NIC 2 has received too manymessages within a certain time period. Additional patterns may beassociated with other types of tampering or other types of abnormaloperating conditions, such as receiving too many messages within acertain time period from nodes having invalid security credentials, andthe NIC 2 operating according to a different software version than theother nodes in the network, for example. The CPU 6 can be configured tocause the LED(s) 16 to display one pattern at a time, although it isalso conceived that the LED(s) 16 can display different patterns insuccession when there are different types of abnormal operatingconditions.

For example, according to an exemplary embodiment, the CPU 6 can beconfigured to detect a plurality of different types of abnormaloperating conditions and/or tampering, and control the indicator deviceto illuminate the LED(s) 16 according to a plurality of unique patternsthat are each respectively associated with one of the plurality ofdifferent types of tampering. The memory 7 of the NIC 2 can beconfigured to store prioritization data identifying a predefined orderof priority respectively attributed to each one of the plurality ofdifferent types of tampering. The prioritization data can be pre-storedin the memory 7, and can also be subsequently updated during interactionwith other nodes in the network. The CPU 6, upon detecting differenttypes of tampering in association with the NIC 2 and/or the associatedutility meter 130, can be configured to access the prioritization datastored in the memory 7 and prioritize the detected types of tamperingaccording to the prioritization data. The CPU 6, when detecting thedifferent types of tampering, can be configured to control the indicatordevice to successively illuminate the LED(s) 16 according to the uniquepatterns respectively associated with the detected types of tampering ina sequential order corresponding to the prioritized detected types oftampering. For example, if the CPU 6 detects multiple instances oftampering, the CPU 6 can control the indicator device to first display avisual indication of a tampering that is, according to theprioritization data, perceived to be more threatening to the operationof the NIC 2 and/or the associated utility meter 130.

For example, according to an exemplary embodiment, the types oftampering defined in the memory 7 can include (i) a corrupted orinsecure software image executed by or to be executed by a processor ofthe NIC 2 (e.g., the CPU 6), (ii) a corruption of a security key withwhich the utility network interface device is enabled to communicatewith a node in a network of which the NIC 2 is a member, and (iii)receipt of a predetermined number of communications with invalidcredentials from at least one other NIC 2 in the network. In addition,the prioritization data stored in the memory unit can identify theaforementioned identifies tampering types (i)-(iii) by an order ofpriority in which tampering type (i) has the greatest priority andtampering type (iii) has the lowest priority, for example.

The CPU 6 can also be configured to output a representation of theabnormal operating condition detected on a digital display provided onthe NIC 2 or provided on the utility meter 130 with which the NIC 2 isassociated. For example, for a closed case utility meter 40 as depictedin FIG. 6, the CPU 6 can be configured to instruct a digital display 19and associated circuitry to display a notification thereon. The CPU 6can be configured to cause the digital display 19 to display analphanumeric representation of a tampering detected by the CPU 6, suchas a code representing the type of the detected tamper. In the exampleof FIG. 6, the LED 16 can be made visible through a window 17 in thefront of the case 18. For an open case utility meter 50 as illustratedin FIG. 7, the LED 16 can be made visible at the side of the meter 50,for example.

In addition to outputting a notification of tampering or other abnormaloperating condition, the CPU 6 can be configured to store each tamper orabnormal event that is detected to have occurred in a non-volatilememory of the NIC 2, e.g., the memory 7 illustrated in FIG. 2. Forexample, the CPU 6 can be configured to record in the memory 7 datarespectively representing each instance of tampering detected by the CPU6. According to an exemplary embodiment, the CPU 6 can control thememory 7 to record each instance of tampering and/or abnormal eventtogether with a timestamp indicating when the tampering and/or abnormalevent first occurred and the duration of the tampering and/or abnormalevent, respectively.

The foregoing exemplary embodiments were described to provide examplesof types of tampering, such as physical, software-based orsecurity-based tampering, for example, and the techniques of the CPU 6in detecting the tampering and thereafter automatically controlling thetransceiver 9 to output an external notification of the detectedabnormal operating condition, in response to the detected abnormaloperating condition. According to an exemplary embodiment, the CPU 6generates the notification signal immediately upon the detection of theabnormal operating condition and controls the transceiver 9 to transmitthe notification signal at the time that the abnormal operatingcondition is detected. Therefore, the CPU 6 can be configured to providethe communication station 120 with real-time notification of an abnormaloperating condition detected in association with the NIC 2 and/or theutility meter to which the NIC 2 is attached.

Accordingly, once the CPU 6 has detected a tamper or other abnormaloperating condition, the CPU 6 is configured to promptly notify thecommunication station 120 so that appropriate action can be taken. Inaccordance with various aspects of the above-described embodiments, theCPU 6 can instruct that the notification message be transmitted by thetransceiver 9 and/or displayed by the indicator device (e.g., LED 16,digital display 19). Accordingly, the CPU 6 can instruct that anotification signal be transmitted to another node in the network, inlieu of or in combination with visually displaying the tamperingnotification according to a visual indication pattern associated withthe abnormal operating condition and/or tampering detected by the CPU 6.

In the case of a physical, software or security-based tampering, theparticular technique of communicating the tampering to the communicationstation 120 may depend on the type of tampering detected. For example,if the NIC 2 is physically tampered with, the CPU 6 can control thetransceiver 9 to transmit a notification signal to a neighboring nodewith which the NIC 2 was most recently communicating or with anotherneighboring node with which the NIC 2 is authorized to communicate,based on its security credentials. The CPU 6 may also be configured withdeterminative processing instructions to determine whether to notify aneighboring node, which will in turn notify the communication station120, notify the communication station 120 directly, or transmit abroadcast message to an indiscriminate number of nodes with theexpectation that any node receiving the broadcasted communication willconvey it to the communication station 120.

The option between notifying the communication station 120 directly orrelying upon at least one other neighboring node to notify thecommunication station 120 can depend on the tamper and/or abnormalcondition that the CPU 6 detects. For example, if the CPU 6 determinesthat the NIC 2 is losing power or may not have time to reliably transmitthe abnormality notification signal to the communication station 120directly, the NIC 2 can transmit the abnormality notification signal toa neighboring node with which the NIC 2 has previously communicated.

In the example where a NIC 2 has its key(s) corrupted or lost, the NIC 2is not able to communicate fully with neighboring nodes, because theneighboring nodes, even if they previously communicated with the NIC 2,are configured not to trust a node with unproven credentials.Furthermore, if the security key(s) of an NIC 2 are corrupted, the NIC 2cannot communicate with the communication station 120 because it doesnot possess the requisite clearance. As such, the node cannot fully jointhe network without authenticated security keys. However, at least oneembodiment of the present disclosure implements the link-layer scheme asdisclosed in U.S. application Ser. No. 12/187,354. According to thelink-layer scheme, the NIC 2 having corrupted or unauthenticatedsecurity keys is allowed to relay a limited number of message types toneighboring nodes, at a limited rate. Thus, if the CPU 6 detects thatits security key(s) are corrupted or not authorized, the NIC 2 caninform a neighboring node, which will in turn notify the communicationstation 120. The communication station 120 can also transmit a querymessage to the NIC 2 having the corrupted security key(s) directly orvia another node, to inspect what remains of the keys in the memory ofthe NIC 2 or to determine other debugging processes to be taken, such aslogging a reboot, event log, etc. In the case where one NIC 2 loses itskeys and does not automatically notify the communication station 120,the communication station 120 can query another node in the vicinity ofthe NIC 2, to relay the query message to the NIC 2 having the lost keys.

Accordingly, for several types of software- or security-based tampering,e.g., lost keys, invalid certificate, attempt to load an incorrectimage, etc., the NIC 2 is not disabled, and can still communicate withits nearest neighbors. However, because these conditions might pose asecurity concern, the level of trust afforded to the tampered orcorrupted NIC 2 might be reduced. For some types of tampering, e.g.,corrupted keys, the CPU 6 of the NIC 2 can be configured to detect thecondition itself, and automatically inform the communication station 120of the detected abnormality. On the other hand, if a neighboring nodereceives a communication from a tampered or corrupted NIC 2, theneighboring node can be configured to, on its own accord, generate andtransmit a notification signal to the communication station 120informing the communication station 120 of the abnormal operatingcondition associated with the NIC 2. The communication station 120 can,for example, instruct the CPU 6 of the neighboring node to transmit ashut-down signal (e.g., an override signal) to the corrupted NIC 2 tocause the corrupted NIC 2 to terminate one or more of its operations.

As described above, the NIC 2, when determining to transmit anotification signal to another node in the network, can detect what modeof communication to pursue based on the detected abnormal operatingcondition and/or tampering and the current level of trust that the NIC 2has in the network. According to an exemplary embodiment, the memory 7of the NIC 2 can have recorded therein tampering type data respectivelyrepresenting different types of detectable tampering. The CPU 6 candetermine which one of three modes communication to utilize intransmitting notification of a detected abnormal operating conditionand/or tampering, based on the detected abnormal operating conditionand/or tampering and the tampering type data recorded in the memory 7.The CPU 6 can be configured to generate the notification signal tocontain data representative of the tampering notification, anidentification of the NIC 2, and a destination address of at least onenode in the utility network of which the NIC 2 is a member, according toone of three modes of communication.

According to a first mode among the three modes of communication, theCPU 6 generates the notification signal to contain the communicationstation 120 of the utility provider as the destination address. Forexample, in the case where the ability of the NIC 2 to communicate ishampered, e.g., the NIC 2 may be able to transmit only one message andmay not have time to wait for an acknowledgement message from thecommunication station 120, the NIC 2 may transmit a notification signaldirectly to the communication station 120, without utilizing aneighboring node as a relay or proxy node.

According to a second mode among the three modes of communication, theCPU 6 generates the notification signal to contain a specificneighboring node of the utility network as the destination address. Forexample, in the case where the ability of the NIC 2 to communicate isnot hampered, e.g., the security credentials of the NIC 2 are notcorrupted, the NIC 2 may be able to transmit multiple messages andreceive acknowledgements for each transmitted message. In this case, theCPU 6 can determine to utilize one or more specific nodes as a proxy orrelay node for communicating with the communication station 120.However, it is also possible that the CPU 6 is not aware that itssecurity credentials have been comprised, in which case a neighboringnode can inform the communication station 120 of the corruption of theNIC 2.

According to a third mode among the three modes of communication, theCPU 6 generates the notification signal to contain the destinationaddress of any node in the network. For example, the CPU 6 can generatea broadcast message that does not specifically identify one or moreparticular nodes in the network, and thus, any node in the network canact as a relay or proxy for the CPU 6.

Accordingly, the above-described exemplary embodiments provide a utilitynetwork interface device 2 having a CPU 6 that is configured toautonomously detect a tampering or other abnormal operating condition ofthe NIC 2. The CPU 6 may detect the prescribed state in accordance witha state signal produced by the detector 20 included in the NIC 2, or mayself-detect the prescribed state in accordance with the recognition ofabnormal operating conditions. For example, the prescribed state may bethe detection that intensity of a magnetic field is below a thresholdvalue, that the software or security protocols of the NIC 2 have beencorrupted, and/or that the CPU 6 receives notification that it has beentampered with or corrupted from another node in the network 100.Furthermore, according to the above-described exemplary embodiments, theNIC 2 is configured to automatically output notification of thetampering event or other abnormal operating condition in response to thedetected tampering, so that the abnormality can be remedied.

As illustrated in the example of FIG. 1, a NIC 2 integrated with a meter130 is a member of a network. According to an exemplary embodiment, theCPU 6 of the NIC 2 which has suffered from the abnormal operatingcondition or tamper can utilize another node in the network as a relayor proxy to communicate with the communication station 120 of theutility provider, or the CPU 6 can determine to attempt to communicatewith the communication station 120 directly.

An exemplary embodiment of the present disclosure provides a utilitynetwork (e.g., network 100) including a first utility meter 130-1 havinga first NIC 2-1 and a second utility meter 130-2 having a second NIC2-2. The NIC 2-1 of the first utility meter 130 includes a CPU 6configured to detect a tampering with the first utility meter 130 and/orits associated NIC 2-1, in accordance with any of the above-describedexemplary embodiments. The NIC 2-1 of the first utility meter 130-1 alsoincludes a first communication unit (e.g., transceiver 9, LED(s) 16,digital display 19) configured to output, external to the first utilitymeter 130-1, notification of the abnormal operating condition and/ortampering detected by the CPU 6 of the first utility meter 130-1 to thesecond utility meter 130-2. The CPU 6 of the first NIC 2-1 can beconfigured to automatically control the first communication unit totransmit the notification to the second utility meter 130-2 in responseto the detection of the abnormal operating condition and/or tampering.According to an exemplary embodiment, the second utility meter 130-2includes a communication unit (e.g., transceiver 9) configured toreceive the notification from the first NIC, and a CPU 6 configured toautomatically control the second NIC to inform the communication station120 of a utility provider of the receipt of the notification of theabnormal operating condition and/or tampering, in response to receipt ofthe notification from the first NIC.

The CPU 6 of the first NIC 2-1 can control the transceiver 9 of thefirst utility meter 130-1 to wirelessly transmit a notification signal,which contains data representative of the tampering notification and anidentification of the first utility meter 130-1 to the second utilitymeter 130-2. The transceiver 9 of the second utility meter 130-2 canreceive the notification signal transmitted wirelessly from thetransceiver of the first NIC, and the CPU 6 of the second NIC cancontrol its transceiver 9 to transmit the notification signal to thecommunication station 120 of the utility provider.

According to an exemplary embodiment, the second utility meter 130-2 andits associated NIC 2-2 receiving the notification signal can operate asa relay for the first utility meter 130-1, or the second utility meter130-2 can operate as a proxy for the first utility meter 130-1. Whenoperating as a relay for the first utility meter 130-1, the CPU 6 of thesecond NIC 2-2 controls its transceiver 9 to transmit the notificationsignal that it received to the communication station 120 of the utilityprovider, whether directly or through an intermediate node.

On the other hand, when operating as a proxy for the first utility meter130-1, the CPU 6 of the second NIC 2-2 is configured to newly generate atampering (abnormality) receipt signal upon receiving the notificationsignal from the first NIC. The tampering receipt signal can contain datarepresentative of receipt of the notification signal and theidentification of the first utility network interface device. The CPU 6of the second NIC then controls its transceiver to transmit thegenerated tampering receipt signal to the communication station 120 ofthe utility provider, in response to receiving the notification signalfrom the first NIC.

In either case of operating as a relay or proxy, the CPU 6 of the secondutility meter 130-2 can control its transceiver 9 to re-transmit thenotification signal or the tampering receipt signal to the communicationstation 120 of the utility provider, if the transceiver 9 of the secondutility meter 130-2 does not receive an acknowledgement message from thecommunication station 120 of the utility provider within a predeterminedperiod of time from when the transceiver 9 of the second utility meter130-2 transmitted the tampering receipt signal or notification signal tothe communication station 120.

The abnormality notification signal can include data representative ofthe tampering notification. In addition, the notification signal caninclude an identification of the NIC 2 and/or its associated utilitymeter 130, such as a network or MAC ID uniquely assigned to the NIC 2,for example, so that the communication station 120 of the utilityprovider is informed of the NIC 2 and/or the utility meter associatedwith the NIC 2 which has suffered from the abnormal operating conditionand/or tampering. The notification signal can inform the recipient nodethat an abnormality has occurred with the NIC 2. For example, theabnormality notification signal can indicate to the neighboring nodethat the NIC 2 has been tampered with, and/or that the NIC 2 isoperating abnormally.

The CPU 6 of an abnormally operating utility meter 130 and/or NIC 2 canbe configured to identify an estimated type of the tampering and/orabnormal operating condition. For example, the memory 7 of the NIC 2 canhave recorded therein data that is representative of defined types oftampering and/or abnormal operating conditions that are detectable bythe CPU 6. The CPU 6 can be configured to estimate a type of thedetected abnormal operating condition and/or tampering based on thedefined types of abnormal operating conditions and/or tampering recordedin the memory 7, and include data representative of the estimated typeof abnormal operating condition and/or tampering in the notificationsignal to be transmitted to a neighboring node. In addition, the CPU 6of the NIC 2 receiving the notification signal can be configured toinclude the estimated type of the abnormal operating condition and/ortampering in the message it transmits to the communication station 120of the utility provider. For example, if the NIC 2 receiving thenotification signal newly generates a tampering receipt signal in lieuof relaying the received notification signal, the receiving NIC 2 can beconfigured to generate a tampering receipt signal to contain the datarepresentative of the estimated type of abnormal operating conditionand/or tampering as contained in the notification signal from theabnormal NIC 2.

According to another exemplary embodiment, the abnormality notificationsignal can indicate that an abnormality exists with the NIC 2, withoutproviding further information as to the purported cause of theabnormality. In either case, upon recognizing receipt of an abnormalitynotification signal, the neighboring node can prepare and send anotification message to the communication station 120 of the utilityprovider, either directly or via an access point 110, anotherneighboring node 130 and/or a relay station 140.

Upon receiving notification at the communication station 120 that a nodeof the network 100 has been tampered with and/or is operatingabnormally, personnel of the utility provider can dispatch a servicetechnician to repair and/or replace the tampered meter and/or defectiveNIC. In addition, since the tampered meter node transmits theabnormality notification signal at the time that the tampering occurs,inaccurate measurement values and the resultant loss in revenue for theamount of the commodity consumed can be minimized. For example, uponreceiving notification of the abnormal operating condition and/ortampering, personnel of the utility provider can initiate aninvestigation into the cause of the abnormality and respond withappropriate action. Furthermore, since the tamper detection is notifiedto the communication station 120 contemporaneously with the occurrenceand detection of tampering, personnel of the utility provider can, ifappropriate, notify appropriate law enforcement authorities at the timethe tampering occurred, which can be beneficial to the investigation ofthe tampering.

In accordance with one or more exemplary embodiments described above,the present disclosure provides a utility meter 130 having an associatedNIC 2 that includes a CPU 6 configured to recognize tampering with arespective software component of at least one of the first utility meter130-1 a second utility meter 130-2 with which the first utility meter130-2 is configured to communicate over the network 100. For example,the NIC 2 of the first utility meter 130-1 may autonomously detecttampering with a software component of the first utility meter 130-1,autonomously detect tampering with a software component of the secondutility meter 130-2 based on a communication with the second utilitymeter 130-2, and be informed of a tampering with a software component ofthe second utility meter 130-2 based on a communication received fromthe second utility meter 130-2 or another node in the network. Inaccordance with the above-described exemplary embodiments, the CPU 6includes a notification unit that is configured to output, external tothe first utility meter 130-1, notification of the recognized tamperingof the first utility meter 130-1 and/or the second utility meter 130-2.The CPU 6 is configured to automatically control the notification unitto output the external notification of the tampering in response to therecognition of the tampering. For example, the CPU 6 can control thetransceiver to transmit a notification signal to the second utilitymeter 130-2, another utility meter 130 in the network 100, thecommunication station 120 of the utility provider, and/or an accesspoint 110 constituting an interface between the first utility meter130-1 and the communication station 120 of the utility provider.

In addition, an exemplary embodiment of the present disclosure providesa first utility meter 130 having an associated NIC 2, in which thecommunication unit (e.g., transceiver 9) is configured to communicatewith at least one second utility meter 130-2 arranged in the network100. The CPU 6 of the first utility meter 130-1 is configured detect atampering with an operating condition of the second utility meter 130-2based on a communication transmitted from the second utility meter 130-2that is indicative of a compromised software component of the secondutility meter. For example, the first utility meter 130-1 canautonomously detect, based on its communication with the second utilitymeter 130-2, that the second utility meter 130-2 is operating with acorrupted or insecure software component, one or more of the securitykeys of the second utility meter 130-2 has been corrupted, the firstutility meter 130-1 receives a number of communications from the secondutility meter 130-2 that exceed a threshold value of an expected numberof communications for a given time period, and/or the first utilitymeter 130-1 receives a predetermined number of communications withinvalid credentials from the second utility meter 130-2. The CPU 6 ofthe first utility meter 130-1 can then transmit, external to the firstutility meter 130-1, notification of the tampering detected in thesecond utility meter, automatically in response to detecting thesuspected tampering with the operating condition of the second utilitymeter 130-2. For example, the CPU 6 can control the transceiver totransmit a notification signal to the second utility meter 130-2,another utility meter 130 in the network 100, the communication station120 of the utility provider, and/or an access point 110 constituting aninterface between the first utility meter 130-1 and the communicationstation 120 of the utility provider.

The foregoing embodiments were described with reference to thestructural features of the NIC 2, the associated utility meter and othercomponents in the network 100. The present disclosure is not limited tothe exemplary network 100 illustrated in FIG. 1. The exemplaryembodiments of the present disclosure can be implemented in any networktopology.

The present disclosure also provides a method of operating a NIC toautonomously detect a tampering condition and automatically notify anode in the network, such as a neighboring node and/or the communicationstation 120, for example. In addition, the present disclosure provides acomputer-readable recording medium having a computer program recordedthereon that causes the CPU 6 of a NIC 2 to perform any of the exemplaryoperations described above. Such a computer-readable recording mediumcan be embodied, for example, by the memory 7 illustrated in FIG. 1.

Combinations of the above-described exemplary embodiments, and otherembodiments not specifically described herein will be apparent to thoseskilled in the art upon reviewing the above description. The scope ofthe various exemplary embodiments includes various other applications inwhich the above systems, structures, programs and methods are used.

It will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that the exemplaryembodiments of the present disclosure can be embodied in other specificforms without departing from the spirit or essential character thereof.The presently disclosed embodiments are considered in all respects to beillustrative and not restrictive. The scope of the invention isindicated by the appended claims rather than the foregoing description,and all changes that come within the meaning and range of equivalentsthereof are indicated to be embraced therein.

1. A utility network interface device comprising: a memory unit havingrecorded therein a software component including at least one executableoperation of the utility network interface device for communicating withat least one of an associated utility meter and a node in a wirelessutility network; a control unit configured to execute the softwarecomponent and to detect a tampering with the software component recordedin the memory unit; and a notification unit configured to output,external to the utility meter, a visual indication constitutingnotification of the tampering detected by the control unit, wherein thecontrol unit is configured to automatically control the notificationunit to output the external notification of the tampering in response tothe detection of the tampering.
 2. The utility network interface deviceaccording to claim 1, wherein the notification unit is an indicatordevice configured to visually display the tampering notification.
 3. Theutility network interface device according to claim 2, wherein theindicator device comprises at least one LED for displaying arepresentation of the tampering notification according to apredetermined pattern of illuminating the at least one LED.
 4. Theutility network interface device according to claim 3, wherein theindicator device is configured to illuminate the at least one LEDaccording to a pattern associated with a type of the tampering detectedby the control unit.
 5. A utility network interface device comprising: acontrol unit configured to detect a tampering with a software componentof a utility meter with which the utility network interface device isassociated; and a notification unit configured to output, external tothe utility meter, a visual indication constituting notification of thetampering detected by the control unit, wherein: the control unit isconfigured to automatically control the notification unit to output theexternal notification of the tampering in response to the detection ofthe tampering; the notification unit includes an indicator deviceconfigured to visually display the tampering notification; the indicatordevice is configured to display a representation of the tamperingnotification according to a predetermined pattern of illumination; thecontrol unit is configured to detect a plurality of different types oftampering; and the control unit is configured to control the indicatordevice to illuminate the indicator device according to a plurality ofunique patterns each being respectively associated with one of theplurality of different types of tampering.
 6. The utility networkinterface device according to claim 5, wherein the types of tamperinginclude (i) a corrupted or insecure software image executed by or to beexecuted by a processor of the utility network interface device, (ii) acorruption of a security key with which the utility network interfacedevice is enabled to communicate with a node in a network of which theutility network interface device is a member, and (iii) receipt of apredetermined number of communications with invalid credentials from atleast one other utility network interface device in the network.
 7. Theutility network device according to claim 5, further comprising: amemory unit configured to store prioritization data identifying apredefined order of priority respectively attributed to each one of theplurality of different types of tampering; and the control unit, upondetecting different types of tampering in association with the utilitynetwork interface device, is configured to access the prioritizationdata stored in the memory unit and prioritize the detected types oftampering according to the prioritization data.
 8. The utility networkinterface device according to claim 7, wherein: the types of tamperinginclude (i) a corrupted or insecure software image executed by or to beexecuted by a processor of the utility network interface device, (ii) acorruption of a security key with which the utility network interfacedevice is enabled to communicate with a node in a network of which theutility network interface device is a member, and (iii) receipt of apredetermined number of communications with invalid credentials from atleast one other utility network interface device in the network; and theprioritization data stored in the memory unit identifies tampering types(i)-(iii) by an order of priority in which tampering type (i) has thegreatest priority and tampering type (iii) has the lowest priority. 9.The utility network device according to claim 8, wherein the controlunit is configured to, when detecting the different types of tampering,control the indicator device to successively illuminate the at least oneLED according to the unique patterns respectively associated with thedetected types of tampering in a sequential order corresponding to theprioritized detected types of tampering.
 10. The utility networkinterface device according to claim 2, wherein the indicator devicecomprises a digital display configured to display the tamperingnotification thereon.
 11. A utility network interface device comprising:a control unit configured to detect a tampering with a softwarecomponent of a utility meter with which the utility network interfacedevice is associated; and a notification unit configured to output,external to the utility meter, a visual indication constitutingnotification of the tampering detected by the control unit, wherein: thecontrol unit is configured to automatically control the notificationunit to output the external notification of the tampering in response tothe detection of the tampering; the notification unit is an indicatordevice configured to visually display the tampering notification; andthe indicator device is configured to display an alphanumericrepresentation of the tampering detected by the control unit on thedigital display.
 12. The utility network interface device according toclaim 1, comprising a detector configured to produce a state signal uponoccurrence of a prescribed state that interferes with the ability of theutility meter, with which the utility network interface device isassociated, to at least one of measure consumption of a commodity andreport consumption of the commodity, wherein the notification unitincludes a transceiver configured to output, external to the utilitymeter, the notification of the tampering to a node in a network of whichthe utility network interface device is a member.
 13. The utilitynetwork interface device according to claim 12, wherein the node in thenetwork is a device selected from the group consisting of anotherutility network interface device which is a member of the network, acommunication station of the utility provider, and an access pointconstituting an interface between the utility network interface deviceand the communication station of the utility provider.
 14. The utilitynetwork interface device according to claim 12, wherein: the detectorcomprises a reed switch configured to detect an intensity of a magneticfield of a magnet in proximity to the utility meter with which theutility network interface device is associated; and the detector isconfigured to produce the state signal when detecting that the intensityof the magnetic field is below a threshold value.
 15. The utilitynetwork interface device according to claim 12, wherein: the detectorcomprises a reed switch configured to detect a presence of a magneticfield having an intensity sufficient to interfere with the ability ofthe utility meter to at least one of measure consumption of thecommodity and report consumption of the commodity; and the detector isconfigured to detect the presence of the magnetic field when detectingthat the intensity of the magnetic field exceeds a threshold value, andproduce the state signal in response to detecting the presence of themagnetic field.
 16. The utility network interface device according toclaim 12, wherein: the utility network interface device comprises atleast one measurement counter configured to measure consumption of thecommodity; the detector comprises a reed switch configured to detect apresence of a magnetic field having an intensity sufficient to interferewith the at least one measurement counter, by detecting whether theintensity of the magnetic field of exceeds a threshold value; and thedetector is configured to transmit the state signal to the control unitin response to detecting that the intensity of the magnetic field isabove the threshold value.
 17. A utility network interface devicecomprising: a control unit configured to detect a tampering with asoftware component of a utility meter with which the utility networkinterface device is associated; and a notification unit configured tooutput, external to the utility meter, a visual indication constitutingnotification of the tampering detected by the control unit, wherein: thecontrol unit is configured to automatically control the notificationunit to output the external notification of the tampering in response tothe detection of the tampering; the utility network interface devicecomprises a memory unit having record therein tampering type datarespectively representing different types of detectable tampering; thecontrol unit is configured to, in response to the detection oftampering: determine which one of three modes of communication is to beutilized for transmitting the notification of the detected tampering,based on the detected tampering and the tampering type data recorded inthe memory unit; generate a notification signal containing datarepresentative of the tampering notification, an identification of theutility network interface device, and a destination address of at leastone node in a utility network of which the utility network interfacedevice is a member, according to one of the three modes ofcommunication, in which in a first mode among the three modes, thedestination address is a communication station of a utility provider, ina second mode among the three modes, the destination address is aspecific neighboring node of the utility network, and in a third modeamong the three nodes, the destination address is any node in theutility network; and automatically control the notification unit totransmit the generated notification signal to the destination addresscontained in the notification signal.
 18. A utility network interfacedevice comprising: a memory unit having recorded therein a firstsoftware component including at least one executable operation of theutility network interface device for communicating with at least one ofan associated first utility meter and a node in a wireless utilitynetwork; a control unit configured to execute the first softwarecomponent recorded in the memory unit, and to recognize tampering withthe first software component recorded in the memory unit, and a secondsoftware component executable by another utility network interfacedevice with which the first utility meter is configured to communicateover a network; and a notification unit configured to output, externalto the first utility meter, notification of the recognized tampering ofthe at least one of the of the first and second software componentsrespectively associated with the first utility meter and the secondutility meter, wherein the control unit is configured to automaticallycontrol the notification unit to output the external notification of thetampering in response to the recognition of the tampering.
 19. Theutility network interface device according to claim 18, wherein: thenotification unit includes a transceiver; and the control unit isconfigured to cause the transceiver to transmit a notification signal toa node in a network of which the utility network interface device is amember, in response to the control unit recognizing a tampering with thesecond software component of the second utility meter, wherein thenotification signal contains data representative of the tamperingnotification and an identification of the second utility meter.
 20. Autility network interface device comprising: a control unit configuredto recognize tampering with a respective software component of at leastone of a first utility meter with which the utility network interfacedevice is associated, and a second utility meter with which the firstutility meter is configured to communicate over a network; and anotification unit configured to output, external to the first utilitymeter, notification of the recognized tampering of the at least one ofthe of the first utility meter and the second utility meter, wherein:the control unit is configured to automatically control the notificationunit to output the external notification of the tampering in response tothe recognition of the tampering; the notification unit includes atransceiver; and the control unit is configured to cause the transceiverto transmit a notification signal to a node in a network of which theutility network interface device is a member, in response to the controlunit recognizing a tampering with a software component of the secondutility meter, the notification signal contains data representative ofthe tampering notification and an identification of the second utilitymeter the node in the network is a device selected from the groupconsisting of another utility network interface device which is a memberof the network, a communication station of the utility provider, and anaccess point constituting an interface between the first utility meterand the communication station of the utility provider.
 21. The utilitynetwork interface device according to claim 18, wherein: thenotification unit includes at least one LED configured to display arepresentation of the tampering notification according to apredetermined pattern of illuminating the at least one LED, and atransceiver configured to transmit a notification signal having datarepresentative of the tampering notification to a node in a network ofwhich the utility network interface device is a member.
 22. A utilitynetwork interface device comprising: a control unit configured torecognize tampering with a respective software component of at least oneof a first utility meter with which the utility network interface deviceis associated, and a second utility meter with which the first utilitymeter is configured to communicate over a network; and a notificationunit configured to output, external to the first utility meter,notification of the recognized tampering of the at least one of the ofthe first utility meter and the second utility meter, wherein: thecontrol unit is configured to automatically control the notificationunit to output the external notification of the tampering in response tothe recognition of the tampering; the notification unit includes atleast one indicator device configured to display a representation of thetampering notification according to a predetermined pattern ofilluminating the at least one indicator device, and a transceiverconfigured to transmit a notification signal having data representativeof the tampering notification to a node in a network of which theutility network interface device is a member; the control unit, inresponse to recognizing a tampering with a software component of thefirst utility meter, is configured to control the notification unit toilluminate the at least one indicator device according to a patternassociated with a type of the tampering with first utility meterrecognized by the control unit; and the control unit, in response torecognizing tampering with a software component of the second utilitymeter, is configured to cause the transceiver to transmit a notificationsignal, which contains data representative of the tampering notificationand an identification of the second utility meter, to a node in anetwork of which the utility network interface device is a member. 23.The utility network interface device according to claim 22, wherein thenode in the network is a device selected from the group consisting ofanother utility network interface device which is a member of thenetwork, a communication station of the utility provider, and an accesspoint constituting an interface between the first utility meter and thecommunication station of the utility provider.
 24. A utility networkinterface device associated with a first utility meter, the utilitynetwork interface device comprising: a memory unit having recordedtherein a first software component including at least one executableoperation of the utility network interface device for communicating withat least one of the first utility meter with which the utility networkinterface device is associated, and at least one second utility meterarranged in a network with the first utility meter; a communication unitconfigured to communicate with the at least one second utility meter; acontrol unit configured to detect a tampering with an operatingcondition of the second utility meter based on a communicationtransmitted from the second utility meter that is indicative of acompromised second software component executable in the second utilitymeter; and a notification unit configured to transmit, external to thefirst utility meter, notification of the tampering detected in thesecond utility meter, wherein the control unit is configured toautomatically control the notification unit to transmit the externalnotification of the tampering in response to the detection of thetampering.
 25. The utility network interface device according to claim24, wherein: the notification unit includes a transceiver; and thecontrol unit is configured to cause the transceiver to transmit anotification signal to a node in the network, in response to the controlunit detecting a tampering with the operating condition of the secondutility meter, wherein the notification signal contains datarepresentative of the tampering notification and an identification ofthe second utility meter.
 26. A utility network interface deviceassociated with a first utility meter, the utility network interfacedevice comprising: a communication unit configured to communicate withat least one second utility meter arranged in a network with the firstutility meter, with which the utility network interface device isassociated; a control unit configured to detect a tampering with anoperating condition of the second utility meter based on a communicationtransmitted from the second utility meter that is indicative of acompromised software component of the second utility meter; and anotification unit configured to transmit, external to the first utilitymeter, notification of the tampering detected in the second utilitymeter, wherein: the control unit is configured to automatically controlthe notification unit to transmit the external notification of thetampering in response to the detection of the tampering; thenotification unit includes a transceiver; the control unit is configuredto cause the transceiver to transmit a notification signal to a node inthe network, in response to the control unit detecting a tampering withthe operating condition of the second utility meter; the notificationsignal contains data representative of the tampering notification and anidentification of the second utility meter; and the node in the networkis a device selected from the group consisting of another utilitynetwork interface device which is a member of the network, acommunication station of the utility provider, and an access pointconstituting an interface between the first utility meter and thecommunication station of the utility provider.
 27. A non-transitorycomputer-readable recording medium having a computer non-transitoryprogram recorded thereon that causes a computer processing unit of autility network interface device to perform operations comprising:executing a software component recorded in a memory unit of the utilitynetwork interface device, the software component including at least oneexecutable operation of the utility network interface device forcommunicating with at least one of an associated utility meter and anode in a wireless utility network; detecting a tampering with thesoftware component recorded in the memory unit; and automaticallyoutputting, external to the utility meter, a visual indicationconstituting notification of the detected tampering, in response to thedetection of the tampering.
 28. The non-transitory computer-readablerecording medium according to claim 27, wherein the computernon-transitory program causes the computer processing unit to, inresponse to the detection of the tampering, cause at least one LED todisplay a representation of the tampering notification according to apredetermined pattern of illuminating the at least one LED based on atype of the tampering detected.
 29. A non-transitory computer-readablerecording medium having a computer non-transitory program recordedthereon that causes a computer processing unit of a utility networkinterface device to perform operations comprising: detecting a tamperingwith a software component of a utility meter with which the utilitynetwork interface device is associated; and automatically outputting,external to the utility meter, a visual indication constitutingnotification of the detected tampering, in response to the detection ofthe tampering, wherein: the computer program causes the computerprocessing unit to, in response to the detection of the tampering, causeat least one indicator device to display a representation of thetampering notification according to a predetermined pattern ofilluminating the at least one indicator device based on a type of thetampering detected; and types of tampering detectable by the computerprocessing unit include (i) a corrupted or insecure software imageexecuted by or to be executed by the computer processing unit, (ii) acorruption of a security key with which the utility network interfacedevice is enabled to communicate with a node in a network of which theutility meter is a member, and (iii) notification of a corruption of asoftware component of the utility network interface device by anothernode in the network.
 30. A method of operating a utility networkinterface device, the method comprising: recording, in a memory unit ofthe utility network interface device, a software component including atleast one executable operation of the utility network interface devicefor communicating with at least one of an associated utility meter and anode in a wireless utility network; executing the software componentrecorded in the memory unit; detecting a tampering with the softwarecomponent recorded in the memory unit; and automatically outputting,external to the utility meter, a visual indication constitutingnotification of the detected tampering, in response to the detection ofthe tampering.
 31. The method according to claim 30, comprising:displaying, via at least one LED, in response to the detection of thetampering, a representation of the tampering notification according to apredetermined pattern of illuminating the at least one LED based on atype of the tampering detected.
 32. A method of operating a utilitynetwork interface device, the method comprising: detecting a tamperingwith a software component of a utility meter with which the utilitynetwork interface device is associated; and automatically outputting,external to the utility meter, a visual indication constitutingnotification of the detected tampering, in response to the detection ofthe tampering; displaying, via at least one indicator device, inresponse to the detection of the tampering, a representation of thetampering notification according to a predetermined pattern ofilluminating the at least one indicator device based on a type oftampering detected, wherein types of tampering detectable by thecomputer processing unit include (i) a corrupted or insecure softwareimage executed by or to be executed by the computer processing unit,(ii) a corruption of a security key with which the utility networkinterface device is enabled to communicate with a node in a network ofwhich the utility meter is a member, and (iii) notification of acorruption of a software component of the utility network interfacedevice by another node in the network.